Iran’s regional ambitions are
not going anywhere
IranSource by Raz Zimmt
IranMiddle EastPolitics &
Diplomacy
Iraqi
women gather at the scene where Iran's Quds Force top commander Qassem
Soleimani and Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in a
U.S. airstrike at Baghdad airport, Iraq February 13, 2020 (Reuters)
Speaking to a diplomat in
Tehran, the Iranian ambassador to Baghdad reported on his activities among
Iraqi Shia. This, he said, included a weekly visit to the holy cities of Najaf
and Karbala, offering bribes to clerics and encouraging them to visit the
Iranian embassy and consulates in Iraq. The Iranian ambassador’s report may be
seen as an indication of Tehran’s increased involvement in Iraq as part of the
Islamic Republic’s efforts to grow its regional influence. However, this report
obtained from the Israeli National Archives was from May 10, 1965. It was
written by the Israeli representative in Tehran, Meir Ezri, following his
meeting with the new Iranian ambassador to Baghdad, Mehdi Pirasteh.
Iran’s regional ambitions, as
well as its nuclear program, did not begin with the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Moreover, the political turmoil in the Arab world since 2011 has only opened
new opportunities for Iran to expand its influence in the region by taking
advantage of Arab countries’ weaknesses. The collapse of the Islamic State of
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a territorial entity and the gains made by Syrian
President Bashar al-Assad—with the help of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and Russia—provided Tehran with further opportunities to expand
its hold over Syria and Iraq.
And yet, every few months, we
are told that Iran is losing its grip on the region. First, it was due to
punitive sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, which “have hit terrorists hard”
and significantly limited its “military adventurism in the region.” Next, it was
because the Israeli Defense
Forces have been successful in preventing Iran from entrenching itself in
Syria. This was followed by recent demonstrations in Lebanon and Iraq, which
have allegedly revealed that “Iran
is losing the Middle East.” Then, the November 2019 protests
occurred in Iran, which increased the hope of regime change.
This was superseded by the assassination of Quds Force Qasem Soleimani in
January, which was presented as a huge blow to Iran’s plans for regional
domination. The latest supposed threat to Iran’s regional dominance is now the
coronavirus, which appeared to be slowing down Iran’s malign activities
across the Middle East.
Iran has certainly faced
several fundamental
obstacles while seeking to bolster its regional
influence. Israel’s activities have been able to delay the pace of Iran’s
military entrenchment in Syria, as well as Lebanese Hezbollah’s armament with
precision-guided missiles. The presence of Russia, the United States, and
Turkey also limit Iran’s ability to shape Syria and Iraq as part of its sphere
of influence. Additionally, Iran’s expansive meddling in the internal affairs
of Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut has aroused growing political and public
opposition in the Arab world. The continued investments Tehran is making beyond
its borders, at the expense of addressing the hardship of its own citizens, has
also led to further domestic
criticism in Iran.
The COVID-19 crisis finds Iran
in one of its most difficult times. The withdrawal of the US from the 2015
nuclear deal and the re-imposition of unilateral sanctions exacerbated already
existing troubles, pushing Iran’s
economy to an unprecedented crisis. The recent sharp drop in oil prices
due to Russia and Saudi Arabia’s oil price war has further aggravated Iran’s
economic difficulties. Soleimani’s death also dealt a serious blow to Iran’s
ability to advance its strategic goals in the Middle East—in the short-term, at
least.
Nevertheless, time and time
again, Iran has proved that, despite its limitations and weaknesses, it manages
to hold on and turn threats into opportunities that preserve not only the
regime’s survival, but its regional influence, as well. Iran, certainly, knows
how to play the regional game in comparison to other nearby players. Tehran has
the patience to wait until its ambitions are fulfilled and is highly determined
and pragmatic, knowing how to adapt its strategy to meet new challenges.
In fact, recent Iranian
activity in Iraq—amid the growing escalation between US forces and pro-Iranian
Shia militias and the political developments in Baghdad—may actually indicate
that, following Soleimani’s death, Tehran is reassessing its missions and
adjusting its modus operandi to the changing circumstances in a way that would
allow it to realize its interests—such as forcing the US withdrawal of troops
out of Iraq—with greater success.
On April 9, Iraqi Prime
Minister-designate Adnan al-Zurfi announced his withdrawal from the role of
forming a new government following stiff resistance from Iran-backed political
parties accusing him of being an “American agent”. Iraqi President Barham
Salih, consequently, named Mustafa al-Kazemi, the head of Iraq’s intelligence,
as prime minister-designate. In the last few weeks, Iran has maintained its
efforts to influence the process of new government formation in Iraq, in light
of its concerns about the prospect of al-Zurfi succeeding in forming a new
government.
Al-Kazemi is certainly not the
one the Iranians would like to see as Iraq’s prime minister. But, when Tehran
had to choose between him and al-Zurfi, the Iranians were able to unite the
major political forces in Iraq against the politician perceived to be the most
significant threat to their interests. This time, Iran’s efforts to
successfully effect the political process in Iraq were not carried out by Qasem
Soleimani. Instead, they were carried out by the secretary of Iran’s Supreme
National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, who visited Baghdad last month
and met with
al-Kazemi, and by the new Quds Force commander, Esmail
Ghaani, who visited
Baghdad last week. Yes, the same Ghaani who, some claimed,
would find it very difficult to fill Soleimani’s shoes.
What is true about Iran’s
regional influence is also true about the stability of its regime and economy.
Iran has certainly faced many challenges both at home and abroad, but, just as
its regional influence is not declining so quickly, neither will the regime nor
its economy be likely to collapse very soon. In fact, years of economic
sanctions and the centralization of its economy, which is characterized by
extensive involvement by government institutions and by the IRGC, have,
somewhat, improved Iran’s ability to adapt to crises.
For many, it is frustrating and
disappointing, but that is the situation—at least, for now. Anyone who
continues to promote strategies based on the assumption that we are on the
verge of a new Middle East without an Islamic Republic—which has, apparently,
been “on the verge of collapse” for decades—and without Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—who has been “on the verge of death” for years—or
without pro-Iranian militias in the region, will be forced to contend with
reality again and again. Iran is a complex and sophisticated state with a long
history and a variety of power centers. However, it is precisely for that
reason that Iran requires sober and responsible analysis based on established
assertions rather than on alarmist approaches—that ignore its weaknesses—or
wishful thinking that exaggerates its vulnerabilities.
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