Could a shakeup in Iraq's PMU
(Hashd al-Sha'abi) lead to greater divisions in Iraq?
https://www.mideastcenter.org/post/could-a-shakeup-in-iraq-s-pmu-hashd-al-sha-abi-lead-to-greater-divisions-in-iraq
Iraq's powerful Popular Mobilization Units (Hashd al-Sha'abi)
are in the midst of a struggle over who will control them and whether they will
remain as one umbrella-group of brigades or split apart.
Recent reports that up to four key PMU brigades could pass to
control by the Prime Minister's office in Baghdad have led to questions about
the underlying disputes driving the changes.
Current events
A letter circulating in Iraq from the Prime Minister's office
signed by Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and presented as his government's decision
asserts that four brigades will come under the control of the head of the armed
forces and the Prime Minister.
Currently the
Prime Minister is Adil Abdul-Mahdi. However he resigned in November 2019 during
the protests that rocked Iraq and there have now been three different
prime-minister-disignates who have failed to form a government.
The letter
would appear to separate these four units from the control of the Popular
Mobilization Commission. The letter was drafted Sunday, April 19 and appeared
on April 22.
The brigades include the 2nd Brigade which is the Imam Ali
Combat Division, originally based and linked to the Imam Ali shrine in
Najaf; the 11th Brigade or Liwa Ali al-Akbar linked to the Imam Hussein shrine
in Karbala; the 26th Brigade or al-Abbas combat division, which is linked to
the Al-Abbas Shrine in Karbala and also ready has been seconded to the Ministry
of Defense since 2017; and the 44th Brigade known as Liwa Ansar al-Marjaya
(Ansar al Marjaiya) linked to Ayatollah Ali Sistani. These units are seen as
particularly loyal to Sistani.
Background
The PMU were created in the wake
of a fatwa by Sistani in June 2014. They were mobilized
to confront the rising threat of ISIS as cities in Sunni areas of Iraq began to
fall to the extremists.
Many of the units
were rooted in existing militias and paramilitaries such as the Badr
Organization, Kataib Hezbollah, Saraya al-Salam, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Saraya Khorasani
and other groups such as the recently formed Harakat
Hezbollah al-Nujaba.
Other groups that were affiliated were raised at the same time,
such as Kataib al-Imam Ali.
The groups had
different affiliations, some with existing power structures and
political-religious groups.
Others were
regionally raised brigades and others were minority units made up of Turkmen
and later Christians and Yazidis and Sunni tribesmen.
The PMU grew rapidly in size to more than 100,000 fighters and
played a key role in taking back cities and rural areas from ISIS.
It eventually also
played a key role in administering checkpoints and controlling areas along the
border with Syria.
As it gained power
the government of Haider al-Abadi sought to make its position official with
parliament approving a law in 2016 that resulted in its incorporation as an
official paramilitary force in March 2018.
Abadi saw its role
as important for the future of Iraq.
Abdul-Mahdi wanted to bring the PMU more under the control of
the armed forces, which resulted in a decree in July 2019
mandating its integration.
However that came
during rising tensions with the US and explosions at several warehouses where
PMU arms are stored.
Key leaders of the
PMU, including PMU commission head Falah al-Fayyad and his deputy Abu Mahdi
al-Muhandis resisted total integration
or interference in their affairs.
The US accused
Muhandis and Kataib Hezbollah of masterminding rocket attacks in the fall and
winter of 2019, eventually resulting in his killing by a US drone strike in
early January.
The US targeted
IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani at the same time.
Elements within the PMU who are closely linked to Iran and the
IRGC have repeatedly demand US forces leave Iraq.
These included not
only Muhandis but also Qais Kazali, Harakat Hezbollah's Akram al-Kaabi and
others.
Hadi al-Amiri,
head of the Badr Organization, also supported pressuring the US to leave.
They joined in the December 2019 protests at the US embassy and
the late January protests with Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters.
The US has also sanctioned elements of the PMU and leaders of
some of its factions, including Harakat
Hezbollah al-Nujaba
in March 2019 and Khazali in December.
Muhandis was
already designated by the US. The US also offered a reward for information leading to Mohammed Kawtharani, a
Hezbollah operative tasked with helping unite PMU factions after the death of
Muhandis and Soleimani. In February a man
nicknamed Abu Fadak
(Abdul Aziz Al-Muhammadawi) took over
Muhandis' role as deputy of the PMU and head of KH. Further tensions with the
US and a rocket attack that killed three members of the Coalition resulted in
new US airstrikes on PMU warehouses in March. In April IRGC Quds Force head
Esmail Ghaani visited Iraq in a trip that was largely
seen as a failure to advance
Tehran's interests.
The inability of Iran to advance its interests or unify the PMU
in the first months of 2020, combined with the continued inability of the Prime
Minister's office to integrate the PMU, with brigades acting in an independent
and wayward manner since 2019, left the large
organization at a
crossroads.
Sistani, Iran and the PMO
The April 19 letter appears to represent a break in the
PMU between groups closer to Sistani and those closer to the IRGC or Iran. It
raised eyebrows for including the Al-Abbas Combat Division as a Hashd brigade
still, when that unit was considered to have already moved to the
Defense Ministry.
The restructering would bring four brigades under the PMO, not
the defense ministry directly. Haider al-Abadi would become head of the Popular
Mobilization Commission, while Abu Dua Kazim Al-Issawi would be nominated to replace Falih
Fayyad. Minority units could also be moved to the PMO, suggested observers. This might change the nature of the PMU in Iraq's future.
Commentators are divided on what comes next. David Witty notes "in Iraq, the breakaway
of 4 PMF (Hashd) brigades from PMF Council demonstrates they don’t want to be
perceived as receiving Iranian support. These are Shrine Brigades that want
additional support from Najaf. They now fall under the army."
The changes come amid other reports about PMU behavior. For
instance a piece of land near the PMO was allegedly
given to KH
recently.
The decision to move these four PMU units was in the works since
mid-March when they met with the Minister of
Defense. Commander
of Imam Ali, Al-Abbas and other units met at the
ministry on March 17. This was interpreted as a result of Abu Fadak's
appointment, distancing themselves from Iran's 'axis of
resistance.' One
writer notes
"Long story short, it's to stress Iraqi independence and keeping
the state from falling into hardened alliances with regional or international
actors. In other words US and Iran because Iraq refuses to fighter
either." Those present on March 17 included "commanders are Ali Hamdani(Brigade 11), Sheikh Tahir
Al-Khaqani(Brigade 2), Maitham Al-Zaidi(Brigade 26), and Sayyed Hamid
Al-Yasiri(Brigade 44)." The commanders of these
units had received support from Sistani's top aide Sheikh Abul
Mahdi Al-Kurbalai for the move.
The units involved include more than 15,000 members and under
the PMO they could become their own division, similar to the ICTS or other
units. Their loyalty to Sistani appears key here, a growing rift within the PMU and an attempt
to stabilize Iraq amid the current instability. There is a vacuum of power in
Iraq without a new prime minister and with oil prices declining.
The result of the changes could see Fayyadh stripped of his role
as head of the PMU and national security advisor, according to Al-Aalem news. This report on April 26 asserted that Haider
al-Abadi and Adnan al-Zurfi, who recently failed to become Prime Minister,
would step into the vacuum of Fayyad being pushed out. More than ten other
factions of the PMU could also leave, including those of the Turkmen, Shebek,
Yazidis and Sunni units as part of he re-alignment. "The source pointed out that
"the factions that are dismantled will not return to the Hashd again, as
long as the Hezbollah Brigades, Badr Organization, Al-Asaib and Saraya
al-Khorasani impose their grip on the body." The sources told Aalem that
the PMU had grown beyond the mandate of the 2014 Fatwa and that this was the
reason for the current rift.
This seems to hint at the rocket attacks on bases housing US forces and turning Iraq
into a proxy battlefield with the US. Abdul Madhi's attempt to please everyone
had led to this problem because he had not kept Abu Fadak from assuming
Muhandis' role.
A second article at Al-Aalem asserts that there are around 17 units in the PMU connected to
Sistani and that overall the PMU has around 164,000 personnel. It points out
that the seed of the current rift began
with disputes
between Muhandis and the Abbas
Combat Division in 2017. Disputes also
involved funding for
this unit. Funding for PMU units
that went to Syria, such as those linked to Khorasani and KH, was also part of
the controversy that led Najaf to push for moving its units to the PMO or
Defense Ministry. Allegations of corruption were also an issue, with claims
that economic sectors were being taken over by those linked to other units that
are part of the camp closer to Iran.
The article notes: "It is clear from
the foregoing that the current formation of the structure of the PMF is no
longer in line with the current political system and the changes it has
experienced. The protesters against the PMU's structure today are much more
than they were when it was created. It is currently facing many crises, in
addition to the major Western and Arab countries urging Iraq to dissolve the
crowd, or to limit its roles and powers, or to reduce its human resources,
review its merger operations with the regular forces, or consider them as
reserve forces called upon when needed with an equitable pension ...The
structure of the current PMU does not reflect the current dramatic political
and economic changes, and the effectiveness of other state groups must be
strengthened at a time of multiple and complex crises, including international
terrorism, internal and international conflicts, and increasing poverty, all of
which affect the necessity of restructuring the PMU."
An important aspect of the rift is that the factions linked to
Sistani and Najaf tend to be linked to shrines (such as those in Najaf and Karbala) and cities with a more territorial and Iraqi outlook, as opposed
to an IRGC regional outlook that may want the PMU to play a greater role
alongside Hezbollah in contests with the US or other Iranian adversaries such
as Israel and Saudi Arabia. With Iraq's current divisions, including budget
disputes with the Kurdistan autonomous region and increasing ISIS activity, the new risk could lead to reduced friction with the US or more instability as forces
jockey for local control.
Another aspect of the rift is concerns by those around Sistani
that the PMU was confronted by protesters last year, with offices of units such
as Badr targeted by the protests. The PMU was supposed to embody defenders of local communities
and not be in opposition to them. When the rift became clear Hadi al-Amiri of Badr went to meet with Sistani's representative Ahmed
al-Sadi. On the list of possible ways to ameliorate Sistani's concerns, the PMU
might replace Abu Fadak.
The wider context is that key elements within the PMU have
played a role on the border with Syria and sent forces into Syria. For instance
a new report notes that Kataib al-Imam Ali has been involved in smuggling in
Syria and sent some 500 of its 4,500 fighters into Syria. The US recently
withdrew forces from Qaim in Anbara amid Iran tensions but Iranian media
stresses that the US wants to remove the PMU from Anbar and the border. The activity of the PMU on the border
has been a concern for the US and US allies in the region. This means that any
shakeup in the PMU that might result in changes at the border would be of
paramount importance to Iran. Iran has played up recent PMU offensives along the border with Syria and Jordan, to
highlight its importance.
پیش بسوی قیام سراسری ، ما بر اندازیم# کانونهای شورشی در شهرهای ایران # #Iran
#سال_سرنگونی #ایران #کروناویروس #قیام_تا_پیروزی #coronavirus
اعتصاب واعتراض #شورش #زندانیان ، تظاهرات# سرنگونی #COVID2019 # اتحادوهمبستگی - مرگ_بر_دیکتاتور #مجاهدین خلق ایران
