PMF’s Disintegration is Iran’s Worst Nightmare
in Iraq
https://rasanah-iiis.org/english/monitoring-and-translation/reports/pmfs-disintegration-is-irans-worst-nightmare-in-iraq/
Iraq’s
political quagmire has been a constant in the face of Iran’s enormous control
over its decision-making institutions and religious narrative. Iraqis, however,
are not ready to submit just yet. At the heart of Iran’s influence in Iraq is
the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The umbrella organization, with militant
outfits dating back to the Iran-Iraq war, has persistently dealt with internal
power struggles but they never spun out of control under the command of Abu
Mahdi al-Muhandis and Qassem Soleimani. Since their assassinations, the
succession battle has left the PMF in tatters.
On April 22, four Iraqi brigades
aligned with Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani parted ways with the PMF
because of the controversial appointment of pro-Iranian Abdulaziz
al-Muhammedawi to head the PMF. This decision has not gone down well with Iraqi
brigades. These Iraqi militias refuse to accept the majority decision while
objecting to the PMF consultative committee as well as the very process itself.
Since
the 2016 parliamentary legislation, the PMF
has been incorporated into the Iraqi Security Forces. Its
commander thus has an official position. His appointment as deputy president of
the PMF consultative committee has yet to be notified. Being the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, then-Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi
did not approve the decision while political turmoil continued.
Formed on the
directive of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the
Iraqi shrine brigades – Liwa Ansar al Marjaiyya, Liwa Ali Akbar, the Abbas
Combat Division and the Imam Ali Brigade – are nationalist militias serving
only Iraq’s interests.
They have
questioned al-Muhammedawi’s appointment from the outset, casting doubt at the
selection process and the PMF’s heavy inclination towards Iran. The stage is
set for a pitched confrontation between Iraq’s Najaf and Iran’s Qom to resolve
a political row about Iraq’s executive office and the cabinet.
The Iraqi
militia brigades have been fuming openly and even Ayatollah al-Sistani is
backing the resistance against Iran’s control of the PMF.
Naturally,
the ‘resistance’ militias are not aloof from society and politics, and are
fatigued by Tehran’s control over their decision-making and way of life. These
differences existed in the era of Muhandis and Soleimani but they skillfully addressed them or managed
those which could not be resolved in the short term. The United States waited a
while to effectively take out the PMF and Quds Force commanders at the very
same time. The void that resulted was underestimated due to a surge of rage and
emotions but three months down the road it has become impossible to fill.
Al-Muhandis, who had emerged as a multi-talented commander of Kata’ib
Hezbollah, commanded equal respect amongst his Iraqi contemporaries as
well as his Iranian handlers and mentors.
The Iraqi government has also
been under pressure to eventually cull the PMF by gradually limiting its
operational capability and role as a parallel security force. The sniper
killing of Iraqi protestors by PMF affiliates further
aggravated Iraqi anger against the organization. Tehran has erred in applying
its Syrian policy of total control and oppression of nationalistic sentiments
in Iraq. However, history cannot be altered. For al-Muhammedawi,
the delicate balance between Iran’s interests and Iraqi nationalism has been
impossible to maintain given external existential threats to the PMF and his
feeble working relationship with various formative units. Though Brigadier
General Esmail Qaani has served as second-in-command of the Quds Force for
decades, his recent visit to Iraq has failed to yield the
expected results.
Growing
infighting among various Qom-aligned and Najaf-aligned brigades hampers the
PMF’s ability to pressure US troops in Iraq. Thus, the Quds Force had to
raise a new militia to
continue attacking US troops stationed inside Iraqi bases. This is a clear
departure from its decades-long strategy in Iraq. After failing to impact the
PMF factions despite his persistent efforts, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan
Nasrallah remains committed to mediating amongst
the PMF’s various factions.
Nasrallah enjoys cordial
relations with al-Muhammedawi. Their relations are decades old. The PMF
commander-designate is a veteran of the Badr Organization, an outfit formed in
1983 during the Iran-Iraq war to fight Saddam Hussein. Following the 2003 US
invasion of Iraq, al-Muhammedawi is known to have fought under
Soleimani. The Hezbollah supremo’s ability to mediate is hampered by his
deep ties with the Qom establishment. The results have so far been unimpressive
and the Iraqi shrine militias are keeping their distance with Ayatollah
al-Sistani supporting them. He was instrumental in the creation of
the PMF through a fatwa instructing Iraqi citizens to defend the
country from the ISIS threat and to volunteer to serve the country’s security
forces to protect the holy shrines. Now the 89-year-old religious influencer
disagrees with the path that the PMF has adopted. He prefers referring to the
PMF as volunteers or ‘mutatawwa’een’ in Arabic.
Pro-Iranian brigades like
Kata’ib Hezbollah, Badr, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, and Harakat
al-Nujaba have better training and financial and war-fighting resources
compared to the Iraqi shrine militias. Iraqi concerns about the PMF taking
over the government in Baghdad have been soaring within political circles
especially after its heavy-handed approach during the anti-corruption protests.
The band of
four Iraqi brigades may seem small but has a greater value in political and
nationalistic circles. Of 150,000 registered militants under the PMF flag, the
band of four brigades comprises around 12,000. Amidst the chaos following the
twin assassinations and the ongoing tug-of-war, more desertions are likely.
Now that the
differences have become bitter and exposed in public, reviving the PMF will be
a daunting task for the IRGC and Hezbollah.
Ayatollah
al-Sistani seems uninterested in backing such a move at all. Perhaps now is the
time for the United States to avoid using force and rely instead on backdoor
intrigues to weaken its fierce foe in Iraq.
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