Regime
in Iran Exploits Canada’s Policy of Engagement Without Pressure
April
20, 2020 | FDD Analysis
Regime
in Iran Exploits Canada’s Policy of Engagement Without Pressure
Alireza
Nader
Senior
Fellow
https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/04/20/regime-in-iran-exploits-canadas-policy-of-engagement-without-pressure/
Canada
has little to show for its government’s conciliatory approach to the Islamic
Republic of Iran following the death of 57 Canadian-Iranians on January 8, when
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) shot down Ukraine International
Airlines Flight 752. Ottawa has engaged in lengthy negotiations without putting
serious pressure on Tehran, so the clerical regime has predictably refused to
allow an independent and credible investigation of the Flight 752 atrocity. To
change this dynamic, the Canadian government ought to impose sanctions on the
responsible parties and launch a comprehensive inquiry into the Islamic Republic’s
illicit activities within Canada itself.
Three
months after the downing of Flight 752, the plane’s flight recorder, or black
box, remains in Tehran, its contents unexamined. The Trudeau government appears
to have calculated that diplomatic appeasement would lead to better behavior by
the regime, including the transfer of the black box to a neutral third party
for evaluation. Trudeau and his foreign minister have met repeatedly with
Foreign Minister Muhammad Javad Zarif in order to “get answers,” as the prime
minister promised Canadians. Rather than oblige Trudeau, Tehran publicized the
prime minister’s timid and deferential approach by releasing video footage of a
February meeting in which Trudeau warmly grasped the hands of a smiling Zarif.
For good reason, this led to widespread derision of Trudeau by Canadian
journalists and Canadian-Iranian human rights activists.
The
Islamic Republic’s contempt for Canada’s efforts to hold it accountable is
visible most clearly in the regime’s efforts to intimidate the family of an
Iranian student at the University of Alberta who died in the crash. His
parents, brother, and aunt sought refuge in Edmonton after the IRGC threatened
them for speaking publicly about the crash.
Ottawa
should respond to this stonewalling and intimidation by designating the entire
IRGC as a terrorist organization. In addition, Ottawa
should launch a full investigation of the clerical regime’s lobbying and money
laundering network in Canada, which is one of its largest and most effective in
the Western world.
Canada
is home to one of the largest Iranian diaspora communities, numbering at least
200,000. Motivated by commercial interests, Ottawa has at times been eager to
maintain good relations with Tehran. Canada’s Liberal Party has historically
pursued a policy of positive inducements toward the regime, including the
re-establishment of formal bilateral relations and increased investment in
Iran. However, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has consistently pocketed rewards
from Ottawa, only to pursue an even more aggressive policy toward Canada.
Ottawa’s
soft policy has also left an opening for the Islamic Republic to conduct
influence operations from within the Canadian-Iranian community.
Canadian-Iranians, many of whom fled the Islamic Republic to escape persecution,
are one of the most successful Iranian diaspora communities. However, the
regime has exploited Canada’s freedoms to establish its own lobbying and
influence network there. Several human rights activists told the author that
many wealthy Iranians with ties to the regime have settled in Canada in recent
years, especially in Toronto and Vancouver. According
to one activist, former regime officials, including those from Iran’s Ministry
of Intelligence, live openly in Canada with their families and even travel
regularly between the two countries.
Furthermore,
a number of “grassroots” and religious non-governmental organizations and even
politicians are suspected of actively lobbying for the Islamic Republic by
pushing for greater diplomatic and business ties between Ottawa and Tehran. The
extent of the sympathy for the regime was on display in January when many
Canadian-Iranians demonstrated in support of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of
Iran’s Qods Force, the IRGC’s external operations branch, after his death in a
U.S. air strike.
Canada
is also reportedly a base for the regime’s money-laundering. Iran’s inability
to access the global banking system has forced the regime to rely more heavily
on the hawala informal banking mechanism to move money around the Western
world. The profusion of informal Iranian currency exchanges in cities such as
Toronto may also be a worrying indicator, although the extent of the regime’s
illicit financial activities remains unclear given Ottawa’s habit of looking
the other way. Some Canadian officials may be tempted to view the large inflow
of funds from Iran as beneficial for the Canadian economy.
The Islamic Republic’s actions over the past few months, from the
massacre of 1,500 peaceful Iranian protesters in November to the downing of
Flight 572, demonstrate that only a policy of pressure can protect Canadian
interests in the face of this malign regime.
Moreover,
it will have to be sustained pressure. One or two gestures will not persuade
the regime that Canada has gotten tough. The regime is also likely to test
Canada’s resolve with new provocations to see if Ottawa returns to its old ways
at the first sign of danger. Yet in the midst of a deep, multi-year recession
and domestic unrest – both brought on by American sanctions – the Islamic
Republic has to pick its fights carefully.
Ottawa’s first step in this new direction should be the designation of
the entire IRGC as a terrorist organization. So far, Canada has designated only
the IRGC’s Qods Force as a terrorist organization, despite a parliamentary
motion recommending that the entire IRGC be designated as such.
The
U.S. designation of the entire IRGC has improved Washington’s ability to punish
those who provide material support to the Guard, making banks, businesses, and
other financial institutions even more careful in their transactions with the
Islamic Republic. Similarly, Ottawa’s
designation of the entire IRGC would prohibit Canadian companies from engaging
with entities affiliated with the Guard, which controls most of the Iranian
economy. The terrorist designation would also pave the way for enhanced
investigation of the Guard’s assets and networks in Canada under the
Anti-terrorism Act.
Designating the entire IRGC will send an unmistakable message that
Canada’s government will no longer placate the Islamic Republic as it
increasingly targets Canadian security in Canada and abroad.
Alireza
Nader is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD),
where he also contributes to FDD’s Center on Military and Political Power
(CMPP). For more analysis from Alireza and CMPP, please subscribe HERE. Follow
Alireza on Twitter @AlirezaNader. Follow FDD on Twitter @FDD and @FDD_CMPP. FDD
is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national
security and foreign policy.
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