PRESS RELEASES
Treasury Designates Vast Network of
IRGC-QF Officials and Front Companies in Iraq, Iran
March 26, 2020
WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) today designated 20 Iran- and Iraq-based front companies,
senior officials, and business associates that provide support to or act for or
on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) in
addition to transferring lethal aid to Iranian-backed terrorist
militias in Iraq such as Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).
Among other malign activities, these entities and individuals perpetrated or
supported: smuggling through the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr; money laundering through Iraqi front companies;
selling Iranian oil to the Syrian regime; smuggling weapons to Iraq and Yemen; promoting
propaganda efforts in Iraq on behalf of the IRGC-QF and its terrorist militias;
intimidating Iraqi politicians; and using funds and public donations made to an
ostensibly religious institution to supplement IRGC-QF budgets. The terrorist
militias supported by the Iranian regime such as KH and AAH have continued to engage in attacks on U.S. and Coalition
forces in Iraq.
“Iran employs a web of front companies to fund terrorist groups across
the region, siphoning resources away from the Iranian people and
prioritizing terrorist proxies over the basic needs of its people,” said Treasury
Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin. “The United States maintains broad exceptions and authorizations for humanitarian
aid including agriculture commodities, food, medicine, and medical devices to
help the people of Iran combat the coronavirus”
Today’s designations were taken
pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists
and those providing support to or acting for or on behalf of designated
terrorists or supporting acts of terrorism.
RECONSTRUCTION ORGANIZATION OF THE
HOLY SHRINES IN IRAQ
The Reconstruction
Organization of the Holy Shrines in Iraq (ROHSI)
is an IRGC-QF-controlled organization based in Iran and Iraq whose leadership
was appointed by the late IRGC-QF Commander Qassem Soleimani. Though ostensibly
a religious institution, ROHSI has transferred millions of dollars to the Iraq-based Bahjat al Kawthar Company for
Construction and Trading Ltd, also known as Kosar Company, another Iraq-based entity under the IRGC-QF’s control. Kosar Company has served as
a base for Iranian intelligence activities in Iraq, including the
shipment of weapons and ammunition to Iranian-backed terrorist militia groups.
Additionally, Kosar Company has
received millions of dollars in transfers from the Central Bank of Iran, which was designated
pursuant to E.O. 13224 in September 2019 for its financial support of the
IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hizballah. Both the IRGC-QF and Hizballah have been
designated by the U.S. Department
of State as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.
In addition, IRGC-QF officials have
used ROHSI’s funds to supplement IRGC-QF budgets, likely embezzling public
donations intended for the construction and maintenance of Shiite shrines in Iraq.
ROHSI and Kosar Company are being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by,
directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
OFAC is also designating Mohammad Jalal Maab, the current head
of ROHSI, who was personally appointed to the position by former IRGC-QF
Commander Soleimani. Jalal Maab succeeded Hassan Pelarak, an IRGC-QF officer and co-owner of Kosar Company, who was
selected by Soleimani to serve as his special assistant on an IRGC-QF-led
committee focused on sanctions evasions activity. Pelarak also worked with
IRGC-QF officials to transfer missiles, explosives, and small arms to Yemen, intensifying the Yemeni conflict and
exacerbating one of the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophes.
Mohammad Jalal Maab is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or official of ROHSI.
Hassan Pelarak is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or
purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
Alireza Fadakar, another co-owner
of Kosar Company, has worked in Iraq on behalf of the IRGC-QF for several years and is an IRGC-QF
commander in Najaf, Iraq. Muhammad al-Ghorayfi is an IRGC-QF affiliate and employee of
Kosar Company who provides administrative support to Fadakar and has
facilitated the travel of IRGC-QF officials between Iraq and Iran.
Alireza Fadakar is being designated
pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf
of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Muhammad al-Ghorayfi is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, Alireza Fadakar.
Masoud Shoustaripousti, another
co-owner of Kosar Company, has worked in Iraq on behalf of the
IRGC-QF for several years and has laundered money for the group.
Shoushtaripousti worked with Mashallah Bakhtiari, who used Kosar Company to
launder money and worked with officials at the Baghdad-based branch of Iran’s Bank Melli to
deposit funds for the IRGC-QF in Iraq. OFAC designated Bank Melli in November 2018, pursuant to E.O.
13224, for acting as a conduit for payments to the IRGC-QF which also used Bank
Melli to dispense funds to Iranian-backed terrorist groups in Iraq.
Masoud Shoustaripousti is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Mashallah Bakhtiari is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF.
AL KHAMAEL MARITIME SERVICES
Separately, OFAC is taking action
against Al Khamael Maritime Services (AKMS), an Iraq-based company operating
out of Umm Qasr port in which the IRGC-QF has a financial interest. The IRGC-QF
leveraged Shiite militia group contacts to evade Iraqi government
inspection protocol at Umm Qasr port and has charged foreign companies and
vessels fees for services at its terminal at the port. AKMS also worked to sell Iranian-origin petroleum
products in contravention of U.S. sanctions against the Iranian regime.
AKMS is being designated pursuant
to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or directed by, directly or
indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
OFAC is also designating Hasan Saburinezhad, also known as Engineer Morteza, who
is involved in the finances of AKMS. As a representative of AKMS, Saburinezhad
worked to facilitate the entry of Iranian shipments into Iraqi ports for the benefit of the IRGC-QF. Saburinezhad is also
involved in IRGC-QF financial and economic activities between Iran, Iraq, and Syria, including smuggling activities along the Syria/Iraq border.
Saburinezhad also runs smuggling routes to help Iraqi terrorist group
KH and the IRGC-QF smuggle goods into Iraq from Iran, and has assisted KH in funding the acquisition and transfer of
goods out of Iran.
Saburinezhad is the Managing
Director and a member of the board of directors of Mada’in Novin
Traders (MNT), an Iran- and Iraq-based company
associated with multiple IRGC-QF officials, including Vali Gholizadeh, who has worked with Saburinezhad for the benefit of both AKMS
and MNT.
Hasan Saburinezhad is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF. Mada’in Novin Traders is
being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned,
controlled, or directed by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on
behalf of, directly or indirectly, Saburinezhad. Gholizadeh is being designated
pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or official of Mada’in Novin Traders.
OFAC is also designating Mohammed Saeed Odhafa Al Behadili, the Managing
Director of AKMS, and Ali Hussein Falih Al-Mansoori, also known as Seyyed Rezvan, the company’s deputy managing
director and head of its board of directors. Additionally, as of 2018, Al
Behadili was focused on facilitating shipments and business transactions to
circumvent U.S. sanctions against the Iranian regime. Al-Mansoori has worked with IRGC-QF officials on
business issues related to AKMS.
Mohammed Saeed Odhafa Al Behadili
is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act
for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, AKMS. Ali Hussein Falih
Al-Mansoori is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being a leader or
official of AKMS.
Sayyed Reza Musavifar, who is responsible for the accounts and finances of AKMS, has
worked with the IRGC-QF to transfer money to terrorist militias, including KH
and Lebanese Hizballah. In 2014, Musavifar transferred the equivalent of
millions of dollars of foreign currency to senior IRGC-QF officials.
Musavifar is a part owner of Middle East Saman Chemical Company, an Iran-based company that
maintained an account at Rashed Exchange, an Iran-based exchange house
used to convert currency for the IRGC-QF that was designated in May 2018 for
being owned or controlled by Mohammadreza Khedmati, an individual designated
for support to the IRGC-QF.
Sayyed Reza Musavifar is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having materially assisted, sponsored, or
provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or
services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF. Middle East Saman Chemical Company
is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for being owned, controlled, or
directed by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly
or indirectly, Sayyed Reza Musavifar.
Additionally, Ali Farhan Asadi is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or
purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, AKMS.
SAYYED YASER MUSAVIR AND MEHDI
GHASEMZADEH
IRGC-QF official Sayyed Yaser Musavir has been deployed to Iraq extensively since early 2014 in support of the IRGC-QF, and he
has coordinated operations between the group and Iraqi terrorist militia
group officials. In 2019, Musavir coordinated with IRGC-QF officials to sell Iranian petroleum
products to Syria. In 2018, Musavir coordinated propaganda efforts with AAH on
behalf of senior IRGC-QF officials. AAH was designated in January 2020 by the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under section 219 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act and as Specially Designated Global Terrorist
(SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224.
Sayyed Yaser Musavir is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
Mehdi Ghasemzadeh is an IRGC-QF official and is being designated pursuant to E.O.
13224 for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or
indirectly, the IRGC-QF.
SHAYKH ‘ADNAN AL-HAMIDAWI
Shaykh ‘Adnan Al-Hamidawi is a Special Operations Commander for KH who in 2019 planned to
intimidate Iraqi politicians who did not support the removal of U.S. forces from Iraq. KH, an Iranian-backed terrorist militia
group that has been a U.S. Department of State-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
and SDGT since 2009, receives lethal support from the IRGC-QF, and has been
responsible for numerous terrorist acts against Iraqi, U.S., and
Coalition forces in Iraq for over a decade, including bombings, rocket attacks, and
sniper operations.
Shaykh ‘Adnan Al-Hamidawi is being
designated pursuant to E.O. 13224 for having acted or purported to act for or
on behalf of, directly or indirectly, KH.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all
property and interests in property of these persons that are in or come within
the United States or in the
possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. OFAC’s regulations
generally prohibit all dealings by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve and
property or interests in property of blocked persons.
In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with
the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to sanctions.
Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly conducted or
facilitated any significant transaction on behalf of individuals and entities
designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions.
پیش بسوی قیام سراسری ، ما بر اندازیم# کانونهای شورشی در شهرهای ایران #
اعتصاب واعتراض و تظاهرات# سرنگونی رژیم # اتحادوهمبستگی #نوروز _مبارک
مرگ_بر_دیکتاتور #IranRegimeChange
مطالب ما را در توئیتر @Bahar iran دنبال کنید
بر اندازیم#
#ایران #کروناویروس
#coronavirus
#COVID2019
#Iran
#سال_سرنگونی
#قیام_تا_پیروزی
#مجاهدین_خلق ایران
