Don’t Let “Strategic Dialogue”
Sink Iraq
By Michael Rubin
May 11, 2020
(AP Photo/Hadi Mizband)
The third
time was the charm. After two previous nominees failed to win
parliamentary approval, In the early morning hours of May 7, 2020, Mustafa
al-Kadhimi formally assumed office, becoming Iraq’s sixth prime minister
since the 2004 restoration of sovereignty. Kadhimi has long been Washington’s
first choice. He is a noted liberal. Prior to entering politics,
he was a writer and human rights activist. In June 2016, he was
a surprise appointee to head the Iraqi National Intelligence Service, and he
distinguished himself. He was a quiet leader who did not seek higher office. He
professionalized the service and demanded its employees always respect the
rule-of-law. He presided over the defeat of the Islamic State but did not seek
the limelight. He also became the mediator of choice: not only between Sunnis
and Shi'ites and Arabs and Kurds but also between Washington and Tehran. Unlike
many other intermediaries, Kadhimi preferred to remain in the shadows.
This is one of the reasons why
he is the perfect man for the job as Iraqi trust in its political class falls
to all-time lows. According to
the Iraqi prime minister’s office, more than 40 percent of Iraqis were born
after the 2003 war. They are less willing than an earlier generation to accept
subpar leadership just because they are Shi’ite, Sunni, or Kurdish.
Iraqis took to the streets in October 2019 to protest political corruption,
lack of economic opportunity, and Iranian influence. When security forces tied
to Prime Minister Adil Abdul-Mahdi fired on the crowds, the protestors demanded
change. Not every Iraqi knows Kadhimi, but those who do respect him.
Kadhimi faces
an onslaught of challenges that dwarf those faced by his predecessors. With 90
percent of state revenue coming from oil, he will struggle to make
payroll. Tapping into hard currency reserves will destabilize the currency and
spark inflation. COVID-19 may have dispersed the protestors, but it has not
diminished their demands. Indeed, the chief mandate Kadhimi has is to implement electoral
reforms and then take Iraq to the polls. This is easier said than done as
meaningful reform requires the acceptance of the Iraqi powerbrokers whose power
it will diminish. Resurgent Islamic State activity and Iranian-backed militias
operating out of government control will further challenge Kadhimi.
Iraq’s stability depends on
Kadhimi successfully addressing these challenges. Washington, however, may soon
upend the Iraqi apple cart. Secretary
of State Mike Pompeo has announced that, in just one month, the United States
and Iraq will begin a “strategic dialogue.” “All strategic issues between our
two countries will be on the agenda, including the future presence of the
United States forces in that country, and how best to support an
independent and sovereign Iraq,” Pompeo said.
On its surface, recalibrating
relations is overdue: It has been more than a decade since Iraq and the United
States agreed to a Status of Forces Agreement and a Strategic
Framework Agreement, the impetus to the new dialogue appears to strategic impatience
in Washington. President Trump
has long signaled its desire to leave Iraq. During an October 26, 2016 campaign
rally in Charlotte, North Carolina, Trump declared, “The people opposing
us are the same people — and think of this — who’ve wasted $6 trillion on wars
in the Middle East — we could have rebuilt our country twice —
that have produced only more terrorism, more death, and more suffering.” The
State Department has followed suit. When Shi’ite militiamen fired a rocket in
the general direction of the U.S. consulate in Basra, Pompeo ordered it
shut. In February 2019, as Iraqi populists demanded U.S. withdrawal, Joey Hood,
then charge d’affaires at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and now a Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State threw fuel on the fire by publicly
stating, “We are here at the invitation of the Iraqi government. And if the
Iraqi government requests us to leave, we will leave.” Certainly,
the sudden U.S. pullback from Syrian Kurdistan and forthcoming
withdrawal from Afghanistan looms large.
Trump has reportedly grown
frustrated with both the expense of the U.S. Iraq presence as well as the
mission set. The United States has spent well over $25
billion training the Iraqi army, and he increasingly asks why such
training should continue into perpetuity if it has been successful, and why the
Pentagon bothers if it is not. Likewise, continuing to assist Iraqi operations
against the Islamic State contravenes Trump’s repeated political
declarations of the Islamic State’s defeat. Trump would also be right to
ask why the United States pays the salary of the Kurdish peshmerga when
Kurdish leaders have enough money to purchase estates in McLean, Virginia,
and Beverly Hills, California.
Abandoning
Iraq, however, will backfire, not only for Iraq but also for U.S. strategic
interests. The best defense against Iranian ambitions in the region is not a
strong offense but rather a nationalist and self-sufficient Iraq able to defend
itself against all regional powers. Here, Kadhimi’s government
represents a dream team: Not only was the prime minister a former
intelligence chief, but also his new defense minister was a former ground
forces commander, and his new interior minister was an army chief-of-staff.
President Barham Salih, previously living in Washington, has a liberal outlook.
Bases will be on the table, but
consolidating all U.S. forces into Iraqi Kurdistan would be wrong-headed.
Logistically it would be a nightmare, as it would force the Pentagon to rely on
the mercurial Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for re-supply. Abandoning
Baghdad to Tehran would snatch defeat from the jaws of victory at a time when
Iraqis regularly protest against Iranian overreach
and repeatedly burn Iranian consulates. Finally, it would be a
mistake to underestimate just how close Iraqi Kurdish leaders are to Iran.
Trump may be right that it is time to move on, but to
help Iraq pull itself back from the precipice, he should focus on the economic,
rather than just the military. Many foreign service firms have exited Iraq's
oil sector both because of low prices and COVID-19 concerns. Prices will again rise, however.
American firms can invest now not only for their own sake and to give
Washington non-military influence, but also because the U.S. commercial
presence denies the same opportunities to Iran. Likewise, American investment
to capture gas now flared will help Iraq divorce itself from reliance on Iran
for electricity. American support for modern banking and finance
in Iraq could also provide a basis for investment to help provide the jobs
necessary as Iraq’s population nears 50 million.
The State Department usually
does not do commerce well—few Foreign Service Officers have business
backgrounds or understand finance—but it should take a lesson from countries
that do: China, Turkey and the Emirates. The face of the U.S. presence in Iraq over the next decade should not
only be Navy SEALs and Army Special Operators, but also investors and
businessmen. To simply repeat in Iraq, however, what the precipitous
withdrawals Trump ordered in Syria and Afghanistan and President Obama oversaw in
Iraq will empower Iran and undercut the most competent leadership team post-war
Iraq has had. The choice is Trump’s.
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